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Star Wars Meets the ABM Treaty: The Treaty
Termination Controversy
I. Introduction
Powerful forces are eroding the nuclear arms control structure
only a decade after the Nixon administration originally negotiated
the structure. Technological advances make it both increasingly dif-
ficult to verify compliance with treaty limits' and increasingly tempt-
ing to employ new technologies that circumvent or violate arms
control agreements. 2 Alleged violations of arms control agreements
by the Soviet Union3 and an avowed intention of the United States to
take actions in the future that currently are prohibited by treaty4 fur-
ther endanger the arms control structure.
Many reputable and influential experts now question whether
arms control is an effective means of enhancing American national
security. 5 Many believe that the arms control process creates inflated
public expectations that require unwise concessions and erode the
will of Western nations to expend adequate sums for defense. The
slow but steady growth of the strategic forces of the People's Repub-
I The advent of the modem cruise missile typifies the verification problem. The
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile now being deployed on the U.S. fleet is a long-
range missile, sized to be fired from torpedo tubes, capable of deployment on a variety of
air, surface ship, submarine, and land platforms, and designed to carry either nuclear or
conventional warheads. H.R. REP. No. 353, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 789 (1980). Counting
such a small, long-range, and versatile weapon poses a grave problem.2 Most prominent among these temptations is President Reagan's strategic defense
initiative (the "Star Wars" plan). The prospect of an effective ballistic missile defense
makes compliance with the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, which impedes ballistic missile
defense, particularly onerous. President Reagan takes what is at least the rhetorical high
ground when he states that "mutual assured survival" through ballistic missile defense is
better than the mutual assured destruction enshrined in the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty.
s On February 1, 1985, the United States officially accused the Soviet Union of vio-
lating the ABM Treaty by constructing a phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk. Washing-
ton Post, Feb. 2, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
For a discussion of the radar, see infra notes 158-65, 173-77 and accompanying text.
4 Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1985, at 64, col. 1 (reporting President Reagan's desire to
develop space-based missile defense regardless of any new limitations on offensive arms,
and quoting Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle's opinion regarding space-based
missile defense: "I am absolutely convinced it can be done; I know it must be done.").
5 See GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITrEE TO THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, A QUARTER CENIIURY OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE PRACTICES UNDER ARMS CONTROL
COMMITMENTS: 1958-1983 (1984). For a more scholarly pessimistic view of national se-
curity through treaties, see L. BEILENSON, THE TREATY TRAP (1969).
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lic of China further complicates the future of arms control. 6 Soon,
complicated bilateral negotiations will become even more compli-
cated trilateral negotiations or will terminate. Against this back-
ground, the second Reagan Administration is debating whether to
scrap the present arms control regime. The funding and direction of
President Reagan's strategic defense initiative-"Star Wars"-is the
focal point of this debate.
On May 31, 1982, President Reagan announced that the United
States would refrain from actions that undercut existing strategic
arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. 7
This announcement amounted to a reaffirmation of the Anti-ballistic
Missile Treaty8 (ABM Treaty) and a political commitment to refrain
from "undercutting" the expired SALT I agreement 9 and the unrati-
fied SALT II accords.10
Current events put in question the United States commitment to
abide by the ABM Treaty and to restrain production of strategic of-
fensive weapons. The deployment of the next Trident Submarine in
late 1985, without significant dismantling of other strategic weapons,
will put the United States over the limit on ballistic missile launchers
on submarines delineated in the Protocol to SALT I, I and leave the
United States above the limit on Multiple Independently-targeted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) provided in SALT 11. 12 Testing or deploy-
ment of the space-based ballistic missile defense technologies, cur-
rently under study pursuant to the Strategic Defense Initiative,
probably constitute a violation of Article V of the ABM Treaty.13
6 Few analyses exist of China's growing ICBM force's effect on the relationship be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. For one such analysis, see Strode, Arms
Control and Sino-Soviet Relations, ORBIS, Spring 1984, at 163.
7 Washington Post, June 1, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
8 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty].
9 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (expired but both sides
pledged not to undercut) [hereinafter cited as SALT I]. Cf. UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 1985 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS 21-22
(Comm. Print 1984) (discussing the ramifications of the no undercut policy) [hereinafter
cited as 1985 IMPACT STATEMENTS].
10 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979 [hereinafter cited
as SALT II] (the Treaty is unratified). For the text of the Treaty, see UNITED STATES ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 246
(1982) [hereinafter cited as ACDA AGREEMENTS]. Cf. 1985 IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra note
9, at 22-24 (discussing SALT II and the no undercut policy).
I I See Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3469, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, re-
printed in ACDA AGREEMENTS, supra note 10, at 153.
12 SALT II, supra note 10, at art. V.
IS See infra notes 67-77, 83-91 and accompanying text.
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In the light of the erosion of the consensus behind the present
arms control structure, five issues are addressed in the pages that
follow:
1. What does the strategic defense initiative ("Star Wars") entail?;
2. How does current international law constrain the development
of anti-ballistic missile systems?;
3. Would deployment of a ballistic missile defense similar to the
system envisioned by the strategic defense initiatiVe require ter-
mination, suspension or renegotiation of the ABM Treaty?;
4. Does the President have the constitutional authority to termi-
nate the ABM Treaty without legislative consent?;
5. How may the United States justify termination of the ABM
Treaty under international law?
II. The Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")
In response to President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech of March
1983, a team of scientists under the direction of Dr. James Fletcher
conducted a study of technologies for ballistic missile defense.1 4
The Fletcher Report identified six broad technological areas that re-
quire development to deploy a high technology ballistic missile de-
fense. These areas are: (1) surveillance, target acquisition, and
tracking of Soviet missiles; (2) directed energy weapons for missile
interception; (3) conventional projectile weapons for missile inter-
ception; (4) control and coordination of battle (communications and
data processing); (5) integrated defensive systems (use of several lay-
ers of different kinds of interceptors); (6) Soviet countermeasures
and tactics. 15
The general outlines of the strategic defense initiative are con-
tained in unclassified sources.' 6 Because only conventional intercep-
tor systems, directed energy interceptor systems, and tracking
systems have significant arms control implications, only these sys-
tems will be discussed.
Conventional interceptor research programs curently emphasize
the development of an exoatmospheric, nonnuclear, infrared hom-
ing missile. 17 In June 1984 a Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)
14 See UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MIS-
sILEs: AN ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (1984) (unclassified
version) [hereinafter cited as DOD Assessment].
15 Id. at 12.
16 See id.; T. LONGSTRETH &J. PIKE, A REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES AND
SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ON THE ABM TREATY (1984); D. Kerr,
ASAT, ABM and Arms Control (1984) (unpublished paper prepared for the Department
of Energy by the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and submitted for publica-
tion to Naval Institute Proceedings) [hereinafter cited as Kerr]; Arms Control in Space, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
The best unclassified source for current information regarding the strategic defense
initiative is AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY magazine.
17 Kerr, supra note 16, at 6.
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missile with these characteristics destroyed a dummy warhead over
one hundred miles above the earth by unfurling a fifteen foot metal
impact net in the warhead's path.' 8
Two other "conventional" programs also are heavily funded.
The Defense Department is developing a low altitude interceptor
missile to complement the HOE missile.' 9 The most exotic conven-
tional program involves developing electromagnetic guns capable of
delivering a projectile at speeds of up to six miles per second. 20
Current directed energy weapons 21 research explores four
broad concepts for ballistic missile defense: laser weapons, 22 parti-
cle beam weapons,23 electromagnetic pulse weapons, 24 and micro-
wave weapons. 25 The laser weapons program is the most advanced
of the four programs.
Because lasers are the most promising directed energy weapons
technology, they will continue to be the primary focus of the techni-
cal and policy controversies relating to arms in space for the next two
decades. 26 The Navy and TRW Corporation dramatically demon-
strated the effectiveness of laser technology in 1978 when a chemical
laser was used to destroy two TOW antitank missiles in flight.2 7 Re-
search continues on both land-based and space-based laser weapons
designed for both anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile roles.
Many technical problems stand in the way of an effective laser-
based ballistic missile defense. The laser power levels necessary for
efficient ballistic missile defense have not yet been demonstrated. 28
Atmospheric conditions, such as fog, rain, snow, clouds, and air pol-
lution, absorb and deflect beams, thereby limiting the effectiveness
of ground-based lasers. 29 Electrical generators and high-powered
optics necessary for laser-based missile defenses are large, and there-
fore, vulnerable to attack and difficult to launch into space.30 Lasers
18 Washington Post, June 23, 1984, at AI0, col. 1.
19 Kerr, supra note 16, at 7.
20 Washington Post, June 23, 1984, at A10, col. 1.
21 Directed energy weapons are systems that focus and transport energy at very high
levels of efficiency such as lasers, particle beams, and microwaves.
22 Laser is the acronym for light amplification by stimulated emissions of radiation.
See E. FESSLER, DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONs: A JURIDICAL ANALYSIS 3-18 (1979).
23 The term "particle beam weapon" refers to a range of concepts for devices using
beams of charged or neutral particles at high energies as projectiles to inflict damage.
Particle beams are produced either in circular or linear accelerators or a combination of
the two. Interestingly, these beams may be stored in circular rings (cyclotrons) for later
use. See id. at 18-29.
24 DOD Assessment, supra note 14, at 25-26.
25 Kerr, supra note 16, at 12.
26 C. GRAY, AMERICAN MILITARY SPACE PoLICY 60 (1982).
27 E. FESSLER, supra note 22, at 6.
28 Kerr, supra note 16, at 10.




also are prone to countermeasures such as clading targets with re-
flective material designed to deflect the beam's energy.
Military reseach regarding particle beam weapons began with
the SEESAW program in 1958. The program initially seemed prom-
ising because many of the disadvantages of laser weapons do not
pertain to particle beam weapons. Atmospheric conditions such as
cloud cover have a lesser effect on particle beams.31 Large power
generators and optics are unnecessary because particle beams trans-
fer energy at nearly 100 percent efficiency. Particle beams are also
more difficult to counter than lasers because particle beams deposit
their energy inside the target rather than on the surface, as do
lasers. 32
The difficulties with particle beams, however, are more basic
than the problems facing laser weapons. The SEESAW program was
discontinued in 1972 because of problems anticipated in achieving
the range necessary for ballistic missile defense and because of the
prohibitively high projected costs of deployment.33 Merely aiming
particle beams presents technical problems because charged particle
beams are deflected by the earth's magnetic field. Therefore, most
charged particle research is directed toward tactical roles such as
anti-ship missile defense. Although recently initiated neutral particle
beam research ultimately should overcome the magnetic field barrior
to particle beam-based ballistic missile defense, the solutions to the
other technical problems are not yet in sight.34
Despite their size, the technical problems related to directed en-
ergy weapons are dwarfed by the problems of providing sufficient
surveillance, target acquisition, and tracking.3 5 Distinguishing be-
tween real warheads and decoys over a large area, through a nuclear
explosion ionized atmosphere currently is impossible.3 6
The Defense Department has initiated several programs
designed to rectify the surveillance, target acquisition, and tracking
problems. The most exotic of these programs, Talon Gold, will use
a special telescope to measure the accuracy of laser tracking.3 7 The
first demonstration of Talon Gold currently is scheduled for mid-
1987 aboard the space shuttle. 38
The high resolution infra red sensors of the Advanced Warning
31 Id. at 25.
32 Kerr, supra note 16, at 11.
33 Id.
34 Garwin, Charged-Particle Beam Weapons?, 34 BuLL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 24 (1978)
(stating that discriminating between reentry vehicles and decoys, propagating the beam
through the atmosphere, correcting the aiming of the beam, and determining whether the
target has been destroyed are particularly problematic).
35 Id. at 24-26.
36 Kerr, supra note 16, at 5.
37 T. LONGSTRETH &J. PIKE, supra note 16, at 27.
38 Id.
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Satellite system, scheduled for deployment in the 1990s is another
attempt to rectify the tracking problem. These early warning satel-
lites will be capable of tracking ballistic missiles during the critical
boost phase of their trajectories.3 9 Boost phase missile destruction is
particularly important because all warheads and penetration aids
lifted by a missile can be destroyed with a single shot.
Two tracking systems currently under development focus on the
later stages of a ballistic missile's trajectory. One system, known as
the Airborn Optical System, tracks missiles using a modified C-135
airplane equipped with an infra red telescope. 40 The second pro-
gram involves perfecting a ground-based imaging laser "radar." 4 1
OnJanuary 25, 1985, in response to preliminary ballistic missile
defense research, Paul Nitze, the Reagan Administration's senior
arms control advisor, announced a major shift in the strategic de-
fense policy of the United States. Before the announcement, the stra-
tegic defense initiative was merely a research program aimed at
advancing the technologies identified in the Fletcher Report 42 as
necessary to deploy a space-based missile defense system if the deci-
sion to deploy such a system were made. Nitze announced that if the
systems explored by the strategic defense initiative prove feasible,
the United States would begin a transition away from mutual assured
destruction-based deterrence policy (MAD), toward a policy of rely-
ing on defenses against offensive nuclear arms.43 The new policy
envisions reliance on MAD-based deterrence during an initial ten-
year period of intense ballistic missile defense research. 44 Then,
starting in 1995, the United States would begin deploying a nation-
wide anti-ballistic missile system.45 A gradual phase-out of nuclear
weapons would follow sometime in the indefinite future.46
III. The Law Constraining Development of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems
In spite of the Nitze announcement, legal as well as technical
impediments stand in the way of space-based, directed energy mis-
sile defense. Of the six ballistic missile defense technology areas
identified in the Fletcher Report, 47 surveillance, acquisition and
tracking, directed energy weapons for missile defense, and conven-
tional weapons for missile defense are regulated significantly by in-
39 Id.
40 Id. at 28.
41 Id





47 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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ternational agreement. Four international conventions-the Limited
Test Ban Treaty,48 the Environmental Modification Convention, 49
the Outer Space Treaty,50 and the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty,5 1-
currently regulate ballistic missile defense.5 2
Article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits any nuclear
explosion in the atmosphere, including outer space. 53 This provi-
sion explicitly bans the system for converting a nuclear explosion in
space into a missile killing x-ray laser beam advocated by Edward
Teller.54
Article I of the Environmental Modification Convention prohib-
its "hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as a means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party."' 55 The Convention de-
fines environmental modification techniques as methods for chang-
ing the dynamics, composition, or structure of the earth,
atmosphere, or outer space. 56 It is understood that the terms "wide-
spread," "long-lasting," and "severe" mean encompassing an area
of at least several hundred square kilometers, lasting for a period of
months, and involving serious or significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources, or other assets. 57 In its
48 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinaf-
ter cited as LTBT].
49 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614 [herein-
after cited as the Enmod Convention].
50 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as the Outer Space Treaty].
51 See ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
52 Four other treaties are relevant to military activities in outer space:
(1) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of the Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S.
No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (providing for the return of astronauts and space objects
found outside the territory of a launching state);
(2) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (launching state absolutely liable for damage
on earth or to aircraft in flight if caused by a space object, but liability for damage occur-
ring in space determined by fault);
(3) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 (requires registration with the United Nations of all ob-
jects launched into orbit or beyond including on the registration form the basic orbital
parameters and the general function of the object);
(4) Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War Outbreak, Sept. 30,
1971, United States-USSR, 22 U.S.T. 1590, T.I.A.S. No. 7186 (obligates each party to
notify the other party of detection of unidentified objects or signs of interference with
missile warning systems if such occurrences create risk of nuclear war).
53 LTBT, supra note 48, at art. I.
54 See Kerr, supra note 16, at 12.
55 Enmod Convention, supra note 49, at art. I.
56 lad at art. II.
57 Understanding Relating to Article I, reprinted in ACDA AGREEMENTS, supra note 10,
at 197.
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present form, the Environmental Modification Convention does not
prohibit any of the ballistic missile defense programs currently con-
templated by the Defense Department. Every administration since
the signing of the Environmental Modification Convention, however,
has studied the possibility of broadening the Convention by deleting
the "widespread, long-lasting and severe" requirement. If the Con-
vention were modified in this manner, conceivably it could constrain
some future ballistic missile defense techniques.
Two provisions of the Outer Space Treaty are central to a dis-
cussion of ballistic missile defense arms control. First, article IV of
the Treaty prohibits placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction in orbit or stationing such weapons in
outer space. Some controversy exists over what constitutes a
weapon of mass destruction. The most authoritative definition is
found in an August 12, 1948 resolution of the Commission for Con-
ventional Armaments. The resolution defines weapons of mass de-
struction as "atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material
weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons
developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in de-
structive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons men-
tioned above."58 Justice Arthur Goldberg, then Ambassador to the
United Nations, reiterated the Commission's definition during Sen-
ate ratification hearings on the Outer Space Treaty.59 According to
Ambassador Goldberg, all that is clear is that conventional weapons
are not weapons of mass destruction. 60 Ultimately, signatories of the
Outer Space Treaty are left by an empty travaux-preparatoires with the
difficult task of deciding for themselves which new weapons are pro-
hibited by the Treaty. Apparently, the more indiscriminate and lethal
a newly developed weapon tends to be, the more likely it will be clas-
sified as a prohibited weapon of mass destruction. 61 Because di-
rected energy missile defense systems are much more discriminate
than systems they would replace, no one argues that they are weap-
ons of mass destruction.
At one time, a controversy existed as to the point at which an
object was in orbit for purposes of the Outer Space Treaty's prohibi-
tions. Today, commentators and state practice indicate that the
phrase "orbit around the earth" means a full orbit rather than a frac-
58 Resolution of the General Assembly Commission for Conventional Armaments,
S/C. 3/32 Rev. 1 and Rev. l/Corr. 1 (Aug. 12, 1948), cited in Prohibition of the Develop-
ment and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of
Such Weapons, G.A. Res. 84B (XXXII) (Dec. 12, 1977) (published in UN Press Release
GA/5723 at 107 (Jan. 5, 1978)).
59 Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 76.77 (1967) (testimony of Ambassador Arthur Goldberg).
60 d
61 E. FESSLER, supra note 22, at 56.
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tional orbit or suborbital flight. 6 2
The second provision of the Outer Space Treaty with space
arms control implications brings terrestrial international law into the
heavens. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
States Party to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bod-
ies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations, in the interests of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international co-operation and
understanding. 6
3
Article III extends the terrestrial customary international law of
treaty interpretation, embodied in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 64 to extraterrestrial situations. By extending article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter to space, the Outer Space Treaty
prohibits use or threat of force in space in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations. It is important to note that
article 51 of the United Nations Charter, providing for the use or
threat of force in self defense, now also extends to space.
The most significant legal impediment to the deployment of a
ballistic missile defense for the entire United States is the Anti-ballis-
tic Missile Treaty. 65 The ABM Treaty and its Protocol 66 limit the
United States and the Soviet Union to one anti-ballistic missile sys-
tem deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilo-
meters. 67 The Treaty limits the parties to no more than 100 ABM
launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles. 68 The agreement cre-
ates a complicated regime regulating the number and placement of
radars capable of tracking strategic ballistic missiles. Development,
testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components that are
sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based also are
banned. 69
On its face, the Treaty appears to prohibit all space-based ABM
systems. A closer reading based upon Agreed Statement D, 70 how-
62 See Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing Reappraisal,
3 GA.J. INr'L & CoMp. L. 114, 116 (1973) (the deployment of ICBM's by the world's major
military powers indicates that these nations do not consider fractional orbitals by nuclear
weapons to violate the treaty).
63 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 50, at art. III. Notably, article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty bans aggressive use of celestial bodies as well as military bases, military ma-
neuvers, and weapons testing on celestial bodies. Id. at art. IV. Thus, the militarization of
celestial bodies is more strictly regulated than the militarization of outer space.
64 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, at 289
(1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
65 ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
66 Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974,
27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276 [hereinafter cited as ABM Protocol].
67 Id.; ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. III.
68 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. III.
69 Id. at art. V.
70 Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regard-
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ever, has led some national security experts to a different conclu-
sion. 71 Agreed Statement D provides:
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems and their components except as provided in Article III of
the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on
other physical principles and including components capable of sub-
stituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM ra-
dars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems
and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance
with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of
the Treaty.7 2
ABM systems based upon directed energy technologies, such as the
high energy lasers under study pursuant to the strategic defense ini-
tiative, clearly constitute ABM systems based on other physical prin-
ciples. 73 Some proponents of space-based ballistic missile defense
systems argue that all basing modes of directed energy systems are
unaffected by the ABM Treaty, because these systems are merely
subject to discussion and limitation under Agreed Statement D, not
addressed or prohibited by the Treaty itself.
74
Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testifying
before Congress stated:
The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing and de-
ployment of space-based ABM systems and components (Article V).
Should future technology bring forth new ABM systems "based on
other physical principles" such as lasers and particle beams, as op-
posed to those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limit-
ing such systems would be discussed before deployment in
accordance with the treaty's provision for amendment.7 5
Although at least one student of international law seems to believe
that Secretary Ikle's permissive interpretation is the strongest of
closely competing alternatives, 76 the Secretary's argument conflicts
ing the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462,
T.I.A.S. No. 7504, Agreed Statement D, reprinted in ACDA AGREEMENTS, supra note 10, at
143 [hereinafter cited as Agreed Statements]. Initialed Agreed Statements and Common
Understandings are conclusive proof of the intent of the parties and are binding. G.
SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS 344
(1980).
71 See Controlling Space Weapons: Hearings on S.J. Res. 28 Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983) (statement of Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, U.S.
Army (Ret.)) thereinafter cited as Controlling Space Weapons]; id. at 104 (statement of Under-
secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle); E. FEsSuER, supra note 22, at 70-71; D. GRAHAM,
HIGH FRONTIER 106 (1982).
72 Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Agreed Statement D.
73 See, e.g., E. FESSLER, supra note 22, at 71.
74 See supra note 71.
75 Controlling Space Weapons, supra note 71, at 104 (statement of Undersecretary of De-
fense for Policy Fred Ikle).
76 E. FESSLER, supra note 22, at 70-71. Fessler states:
Agreed Interpretation (D] read in conjunction with Article II(1) of the
ABM Treaty firmly implies that the original definition [of ABM system] was
not intended to extend to "ABM systems based on other physical princi-
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with the legislative history of the ABM Treaty ratification process.
During the ratification hearings, officials of the Defense Depart-
ment77 and the State Department 78 stated that the ABM Treaty pro-
hibited any deployment of directed-energy weapons for ballistic
missile defense. Chief Negotiator Gerard Smith stated that "systems
employing possible future types of components to perform the func-
tions of launchers, interceptors and radars are banned unless the
Treaty is amended. [Agreed Statement D, which establishes this
ban,] was initialed by Semenov and me on the day the SALT agree-
ments were signed. As an initialed common understanding, it is as
binding as the text of the ABM Treaty." 79
Several other provisions of the Treaty are important to an analy-
sis of the current treaty termination controversy. First, the ABM
agreement forbids development of ABM launchers capable of
launching more than one missile at a time.80 Second, rapidly reload-
able launchers, 8t as well as interceptor missiles with multiple war-
heads, are banned.8 2 Finally, a complex regime regulating radar
development and deployment is embodied in ten articles, four
agreed statements, two common understandings, two unilateral
statements, and a number of secret procedures.8 3
IV. Defense Programs Versus Treaty Obligations
The ballistic missile defense system envisioned by the strategic
pies." Certainly, an ABM system that employs either a laser or particle-beam
device would constitute one based on other physical principles. Accordingly,
it would seem that while the parties to the treaty may be obligated to consult
pursuant to their obligations under Articles XIII and XIV, such systems may
not be limited under the terms of the agreement itself. At the very minimum,
a counterclaim of this nature based on Agreed Interpretation [D] places the
applicability of the ABM Treaty with regard to directed-energy weapons in
grave doubt ....
Id. at 71.
Fessler's treatment of Agreed Statement E is confused. For a more reasoned ap-
proach, see infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
77 See Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems and
the Intenm Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1972) (statement of Dr. Foster, Directer of De-
fense Research and Engineering: "One cannot deploy a fixed land based laser ABM sys-
tem which is capable of substituting for an ABM radar, ABM launcher or ABM interceptor
missile."); id. at 438 (statement of Gen. Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force).
78 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972) (statement of Secretary of State William Rogers:
"Under the Agreement, we provide that exotic ABM systems may not be deployed and
that would include, of course, ABM systems based on the laser principle.").
79 G. SMITH, supra note 70, at 344.
80 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. V(2).
81 Id.
82 Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Agreed Statement E.
83 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at arts. I-IX, XII; Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at
Agreed Statements A, B, D, F; id. at Common Understandings B-C; id at Unilateral State-
ments B, D.
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defense initiative clearly fails to comport with the ABM Treaty. The
system envisioned includes more than 100 launchers, space-based
components, and components based on directed energy principles.8 4
Article III of the ABM Treaty and the Protocol limit each party to
100 launchers.8 5 Space-based ABM components are prohibited
under article V. 8 6 Read together, articles II and III impose a general
prohibition on all systems designed to counter ballistic missiles in
flight trajectory, including directed energy systems, except systems
based on the interceptor missile principle.8 7 Under Agreed State-
ment D, specific limitations on directed energy programs are subject
to discussion and agreement.88
The ABM Treaty restrains more than deployment of the systems
explored by the strategic defense initiative. The Treaty also prohib-
its development and testing of sea-based, air-based, space-based,
and mobile land-based ABM components.8 9 Therefore, ballistic mis-
sile defense programs will contravene treaty provisions before the
scheduled 1995 deployment date.
During the ratification hearings for the ABM Treaty, Gerard
Smith drew a line between allowable ABM research and prohibited
ABM development. According to Smith, both parties agreed that de-
velopment occurs when a component moves from laboratory testing
to field testing using either a prototype or bread board model.90
Several of the ballistic missile defense programs previously discussed
in this comment are of questionable legality in light of these restric-
tions on development.
Testing the Talon Gold target tracking laser 9' against a target
that has a flight trajectory similar to that of a ballistic missile will
violate the Treaty. 92 To the extent that the Airborn Optical Sys-
tem 93 is designed for ballistic missile defense, the flight test of the
modified C-13, airplane scheduled for sometime in the late-1980's
will also constitute a breach.94
Arguably, the Homing Overlay Experiment 95 of June 1984 al-
84 See DOD Assessment, supra note 14, for the most informed vision of a future ballis-
tic missile defense.
85 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. III; ABM Protocol, supra note 66, at art. I.
86 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. V.
87 Id. at arts. II-III. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. See also 1985 IMPACT
STATEMENTS, supra note 9, at 251-52 (ABM Treaty prohibits deployment of even fixed,
land-based directed energy systems unless the parties amend the Treaty).
88 Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Agreed Statement D.
89 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. V.
90 See Controlling Space Weapons, supra note 71, at 68 (reprint of statement by Am-
bassador Smith).
91 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
92 See T. LONGSTRETH &J. PIKE, supra note 16, at 27.
93 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94 See T. LONGSTRETH &J. PIKE, supra note 16, at 28.
95 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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ready has violated the ABM Treaty. In the experiment, the United
States used a modified Minuteman I ICBM to boost an ABM warhead
into space. The Soviet Union protested that this test constituted giv-
ing a non-ABM missile ABM capabilities contrary to article VI of the
Treaty.96 Because functionally related, observable differences exist,
however, between the Minuteman I ICBM and the Minuteman I
ABM booster, and because Minuteman I ICBMs no longer are
deployed by the United States, the Minuteman I ABM booster is best
seen as a permitted new, fixed, land-based ABM missile rather than a
prohibited non-ABM missile tested in ABM mode.
The only exotic weapon that may be seen as based upon allowa-
ble interceptor missile principles rather than on prohibited "other
physical principles" is the electromagnetic rail gun. 97 Instead of fail-
ing the test of legality under article III, the rail gun fails the test of
article V, which bans automatic or rapidly reloadable ABM
launchers.
While much is prohibited by the ABM Treaty, many very signifi-
cant concepts are left untouched. For instance, there are no restric-
tions on the deployment of a space-based directed energy weapons
systems designed to destroy missiles in their silos. Anti-satillite sys-
tems development is unrestricted by international law, although
their use is constrained by several agreements. 98 Research and labo-
ratory development of any ABM system is permissible. The ABM
Treaty permits research, development, and testing, but not deploy-
ment of fixed, land-based directed energy ABM systems.99 Anti-tacti-
cal missiles are unrestricted provided that they are truly designed to
counter tactical as opposed to strategic missiles, and as long as they
are not tested against objects with strategic ballistic missile
trajectory.
Thus far, programs within the strategic defense initiative have
complied with the ABM Treaty. By developing and testing subcom-
ponents of space-based systems separately, rather than testing entire
space-based ABM components, compliance with the ABM Treaty has
not conflicted with progress on ballistic missile defense. If the Rea-
gan Administration desires to meet the 1995 target date for deploy-
ment of a nationwide ballistic missile defense, tests of entire space-
based ABM components must begin soon. If these tests are to be
lawful, the United States must suspend, terminate, or persuade the
96 See T. LONGSTRETH &J. PIKE, supra note 16, at 30.
97 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
98 Destruction of a satellite used to verify the ABM Treaty is a violation of article
XII(2) of the ABM Treaty. A party at fault for destroying a satellite is liable for damages
under article III of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762. The intentional, unjustified
destruction of a satellite constitutes a prohibited use of force under U.N. CHARTER art. II,
para. 4.
99 See, e.g., 1985 IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra note 9, at 251-52.
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Soviet Union to modify the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union appears
unlikely to agree to modification, 100 and very difficult legal questions
surround the American treaty termination process.
V. Who Has Constitutional Power to Terminate the ABM Treaty
A President who decides to suspend or terminate the ABM
Treaty will want clear constitutional authority to do so. Unfortu-
nately, the 200-year-old American constitutional democracy has yet
to settle whether the President may terminate a treaty without legis-
lative consent. 10 1 Perhaps the dual nature of treaties-they are both
compacts with foreign states and part of the municipal law of the
United States-best explains the unsettled state of the law.
Commentators have isolated several procedures used in the past
to terminate the domestic status of treaties as the supreme law of the
land. 10 2 First, inconsistent terms in a subsequent treaty between the
parties supersede the terms of a previous treaty.' 03 Second, Con-
gress has used legislation and joint resolutions to "direct" the Presi-
dent to give notice of treaty termination to foreign governments. 10 4
It is not settled whether the President must follow the congressional
dictate, 10 5 however, the congressional action nullifies the municipal
effect of a treaty. 10 6 The simple enactment of legislation inconsis-
tent with the terms of a previously ratified treaty ends the domestic
status of treaty terms.107
Executive denunciation pursuant to a resolution passed by two-
thirds of the Senate is the most obviously constitutional termination
procedure. Interestingly, the political branches have invoked this
third procedure only twice in nearly two hundred years.' 08 Often an
exchange of notes between the President and the chief executive of
another state has sufficed to terminate treaties. 10 9 Finally, the Presi-
100 Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
101 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 715 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, C.J., concurring), va-
cated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
102 See, e.g., McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
ments, 54 YALE LJ. 181, 333-38 (1944-45).
103 1 W. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 782 (1910).
104 See, e.g., 1 Stat. 578 (1789) (voiding treaties with France; viewed as a partial decla-
ration of war, and therefore, a constitutional act by several Supreme Court Justices). Bas
v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dali.) 37 (1800). See also Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of
Treaties, 15 AM.J. INT'L L. 34 (1921); 38 Stat. 1184 (1915).
105 See Reeves, supra note 104, at 34-35 (President Wilson signed the Jones Act but
refused on constitutional grounds to give the notices of treaty termination mandated
under section 34 of the Act).
106 Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1936).
107 Pigeon River Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138 (1933).
108 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., Materials on Termination
of Treaties: The ConstitutionalAllocation of Power, 54 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Materials on Termination].
109 1 W. MALLOY, supra note 103, at 854.
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dent unilaterally has denounced treaties without congressional au-
thorization thirteen times in the past." t0
Any United States president wishing to terminate a treaty with as
large a domestic and international constituency as the ABM Treaty's
constituency would prefer to act pursuant to a congressional man-
date. The very strength of the constituencies that make a congres-
sional mandate particularly desirable, however, makes that mandate
unlikely. The unlikelihood of a congressional mandate makes the
constitutionality of the President's power to terminate the ABM
Treaty extremely important.
In 1979 Goldwater v. Carter"' presented the issue whether the
President may terminate a defense treaty without congressional con-
sent. The case arose when nine Senators and sixteen members of
the House of Representatives attempted to enjoin the executive from
abrogating the mutual defense treaty between the United States and
the Republic of China."12
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
enjoined the Secretary of State from taking any action to implement
the President's notice of termination unless and until the notice was
approved by a majority of both houses of Congress or by two-thirds
of the Senate.' '3 Judge Gasch stated that the President may, acting
alone, terminate a treaty under special circumstances.' 14 These spe-
cial circumstances obtain when the treaty becomes impossible to per-
form, is affected by a fundamental change in circumstances, or is
denounced or violated by the other party." 5 Because the rationale
advanced by the executive was not based on any of these circum-
stances, the court held that legislative approval was required." 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
110 See Materials on Termination, supra note 108, at 397-98. The earliest case of unilat-
eral termination was in 1815 when Secretary of State Monroe notified the Dutch Ambassa-
dor to the United States that the Treaty of 1782 with the Netherlands was terminated.
McDougal & Lans, supra note 102, at 336 n.127. The most recent case of unilateral termi-
nation occurred when President Carter abrogated the United States-Republic of China
mutual defense treaty. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979).
11' Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.) (enjoining the State Department
from terminating the United States-Republic of China mutual defense treaty), rev'd, 617
F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (even without congressional consent, the President may abrogate a
mutual defense treaty in accordance with the Treaty's termination clause if it is without
conditions and without designation as to who was empowered to abrogate), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (a deeply divided Court held that the case was not justiciable for conflict-
ing reasons).
112 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of
China, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213 (entered into force March 3,
1955).
113 481 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D.D.C. 1979).
'14 Id. at 959 n.46.
115 Id. at 959, 962-65.
116 Id. at 965.
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Circuit quashed the injunction."i 7 The court rested its holding on
the existence of an abrogation provision in the Treaty'18 and on the
President's undisputed constitutional authority to derecognize the
Republic of China.' 9 The court held that the President acted con-
stitutionally because abrogation of the mutual defense treaty pursu-
ant to the withdrawal clause was merely a step in the process of
derecognizing the Republic of China.' 20
Factors analogous to the two factors that persuaded the court of
appeals in Goldwater attend the case for Presidential authority to ter-
minate the ABM Treaty. Both treaties have termination clauses.' 2 '
While the abrogation in Goldwater directly related to the President's
constitutional responsibility for recognizing foreign governments,
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty directly relates to the President's
constitutional responsibility as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces.
The Goldwater case spawned two other important opinions in the
court of appeals. Chief Judge Wright agreed to quash the district
court injunction, but grounded his opinion on Senator Goldwater's
lack of standing in the absence of legislative action in conflict with
the executive. 122 Judge MacKinnon agreed with the majority that
Senator Goldwater had standing, and that the case was justiciable. 12 3
Judge MacKinnon argued, however, that because the Constitution
requires congressional action for ratification of a treaty, it requires
congressional action in the abrogation of treaties as well. 124 The re-
117 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For an excellent discussion of this decision, see
Note, The Constitutional Twilight Zone of Treaty Termination: Goldwater v. Carter, 20 VA. J.
INT'L L. 147 (1979-80).
118 Id. at 708 ("[T~he President's authority as Chief Executive is at its zenith when the
Senate has consented to a treaty that expressly provides for termination on one year's
notice, and the President's action is the giving of notice of termination.").
119 Id. at 707. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942).
120 617 F.2d at 707-08.
121 Compare Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Re-
public of China, supra note 112, at art. X ("This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.
Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party."),
with the ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. XV:
I. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right
to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other
party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice
shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Id.
122 617 F.2d at 714-15 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
123 617 F.2d at 716 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). For a
scholarly defense of Judge MacKinnon's views, see Berger, The President's Unilateral Termi-
nation of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 577 (1980-81).
124 Id. at 716 passim.
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suit suggested by ChiefJudge Wright's opinion carried the day in the
United States Supreme Court.
A deeply divided Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals
decision without hearing oral argument. 125 In the first opinion re-
ported, Justice Powell followed Chief Judge Wright and voted to va-
cate, because without a legislative resolution in opposition to the
President's action, the issue was not ripe. 126 Justice Rehnquist and
three other justices argued that the issue of who may terminate a
treaty is a nonjusticiable political question to be resolved by the
political branches alone.' 2 7 Justice Marshall concurred in the result
without issuing an opinion, 128 while Justices Blackmun and White
argued for hearing the case on the merits. 129
Although no justice voted to reverse the court of appeals, only
Justice Brennan wrote in favor of affirming. °30 Justice Brennan
would have affirmed on the narrow ground that abrogation of the
treaty was tantamount to withdrawing recognition from a foreign
government-an action clearly within the President's constitutional
powers in foreign affairs.' 3 ' AlthoughJustice Brennan failed to per-
suade his colleagues on the merits, his rebuttal toJustice Rehnquist's
political question doctrine argument contributes significantly to the
hope of an orderly, judicial settlement of the controversy regarding
the authority to terminate treaties.' 3 2 In rebuttal, Justice Brennan
stated:
Properly understood, the political-question doctrine restrains courts
from reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordi-
nate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been "constitutional[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211-213, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when a
court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular
branch has been constitutionally designated as a repository of polit-
ical decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
519-521 (1969).13 s
The only message lower courts may discern from Goldwater is
that the issue of who possesses the constitutional authority to termi-
nate treaties becomes justiciable, if at all, only after Congress offi-
cially announces one policy, while the President attempts to execute
125 444 U.S. 996 (1979). For a detailed discussion, see Note, Executive Action, Goldwa-
ter v. Carter, and the Allocation of the Treaty Termination Power, 15 GA. L. REV. 176 (1980-81).
126 Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 1007 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 996.
129 Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
Is0 Id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Id.
132 This constitutional controversy is not just the stuff of professorial musings. Trea-
ties are not just the children of war and peace, but also their sires. It is not too difficult to
conceive of a situation where lack, of certainty with regard to the force of a treaty obliga-
tion could have grave national security implications.
133 444 U.S. 996, 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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another. This unresolved state of affairs leaves constitutional schol-
ars to contemplate what the Supreme Court ought to hold, should
the Court reach the merits of this controversy in the future.
One potentially illuminating foreshadow of the ultimate resolu-
tion of the treaty termination controversy is Myers v. United States.1
34
In Myers the Supreme Court upheld the President's authority to uni-
laterally dismiss an executive official appointed with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Examining article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution, which authorizes the President to appoint public minis-
ters as well as to make treaties, Chief Justice Taft stated:
The executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by
specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was
limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed, and the
fact that no expressed limit was placed on the power of removal by
the Executive was convincing indication that none was intended.
1M
The grammatical analogy between the power of personnel removal
and treaty termination is obvious, yet the precedential value of Myers
is small.' 3 6 The Constitution rarely allows sterile grammatical logic
to govern important constitutional issues.'
3 7
Charlton v. Kelly' 38 provides more persuasive precedent. In
Charlton it was alleged that the extradition treaty between the United
States and Italy was void due to violations by the Italian Govern-
ment. 13 9 The Supreme Court concluded that an innocent party to a
violated treaty may "waive" the right to terminate, and, in the ab-
sence of a decision to terminate, the treaty remained in force.' 4 ° In
dicta, the Court implied that the executive may unilaterally terminate
a breached treaty:
The executive department having thus elected to waive any right to
free itself from the obligation to deliver up its own citizens, it is the
plain duty of this court to recognize the obligation to surrender the
appellant as one imposed by the treaty as the supreme law of the
land .... 141
Charlton stands as a beacon of settled law in a sea of controversy.
The obligatory pilgrimage to the writings of the framers provides
little assistance. Predictably, Federalist James Madison would give
134 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
'35 Id. at 118. But see Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (limiting
the Myers grant of Presidential power to purely executive appointments as opposed to
those appointments involving quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative duties such as Federal
Trade Commissioners).
136 Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 960; 617 F.2d at 703-04 (questioning the precedential
value of Myers in treaty termination cases).
137 Id.
138 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
139 Id. at 452-53.
140 Id. at 476.
'4' Id. See also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902) (President has discretion to
determine when changed circumstances justify abrogating a treaty).
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the executive termination power,' 4 2 while Jefferson would not.143
The commentators are also split, with some being more solicitous of
Presidential power' 4 4 and others being less so.' 45 Some commenta-
tors urge Congress to require that treaties contain precise termina-
tion procedures, ' 46 while others recommend settling the controversy
through a case-by-case judicial balancing test, comparing the inter-
ests of the political branches in the subject matter of the treaty, the
importance of the treaty, and the domestic effect of ending the
treaty. 147
The greatest weight of authority seems to support the rule ad-
vanced by the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. 148 Under
the Restatement, the President may unilaterally denounce an interna-
tional agreement if it is done in accordance with a withdrawal provi-
sion included in the agreement, in response to treaty violations by
another party, or in recognition of the legal dis-establishment of an-
other state.149 In the absence of one of these three conditions, the
Restatement requires approval by two-thirds of the Senate. 150
Because Soviet violations are both easily trumped up and readily
apparent,' 5 ' Charlton should be sufficient authority for the constitu-
tionality of unilateral Presidential denunciation of a breached
treaty. 152 The withdrawal provision' 53 in the ABM Treaty only
strengthens the executive's municipal law case.
142 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 524 U. Lippincott ed. 1865)
(Madison earlier had expressed a contrary view).
143 MANUAL OF PROCEDURE, reprinted in SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 668 (1975) ("Treaties being declared equally with the laws of the United States, to be
the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act of the legislature alone can de-
clare them infringed and rescinded.").
144 L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); Nelson, The Termina-
tion of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 879 (1957-58); Reeves, The Jones Act and Denunciation of Treaties, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 28
(1921); Comment, Constitutional Law--Termination of Treaties, 35 MICH. L. REV. 88 (1936).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 163 (1962).
145 E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 109-16 (1917);
Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition of the Repub-
lic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 931 (1978); Comment, PresidentialAmendment and Termination
of Treaties: The Case of the Warsaw Convention, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 580 (1966-67); McDougal &
Reisman, Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?, NAT'L LJ., May 21, 1979, at 19.
146 Scheffer, supra note 145, at 995-1005.
147 Comment, Resolving Treaty Termination Disputes, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1189 (1981).
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 163 (1962).
49 1& at § 163(i).
150 Id. at § 163(ii) comment e (except in special cases listed in clause (i), modification,
suspension, and termination are in effect new agreements).
151 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
152 Clearly, the existence of a treaty violation is a nonjusticiable political question, cf.
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), and reserved for the President, Charlton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). Furthermore, the Executive has already determined that the
Soviet Union has violated the ABM Treaty. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
153 For the text of the withdrawal provision of the ABM Treaty, see supra note 121.
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VI. Justifying Termination of the ABM Treaty Under International
Law
Proper termination of a treaty under United States municipal
law does not ensure that the termination comports with international
law.' 54  Unless a party finds justification for abrogating a treaty
under international law, termination, though legally effective under
municipal law, constitutes a breach of international law.' 55
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 156 generally
codifies the customary international law of treaty termination.
157
Part V, section 2 of the Convention enumerates the conditions that
make treaties void or voidable at formation.158 None of these condi-
tions were present at the formation of the ABM Treaty. Termination
and suspension of treaties in response to conditions arising after for-
mation are governed by part V, section 3 of the Vienna Conven-
tion. 159 Arguably, three of these post-formation conditions
currently prevail with respect to the ABM Treaty.' 60
First, the United States could attempt to justify termination of
the ABM Treaty on the ground that the emergence of directed en-
ergy technology constitutes a "fundamental change of circum-
stances" under article 62 of the Vienna Convention. For a change of
circumstances to be fundamental, it must be unforeseen,' 6 1 relate to
154 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 64, at art. XXVII.
'55 Id.
156 Id.
157 Cf The Namibia Case, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 47 (advisory opinion); Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982) (citing and following a Vienna Convention rule without further
explanation or authority).
158 Vienna Convention, supra note 64, at part V, § 2. The conditions making a treaty
void at formation are: (1) Acquisition of a state's consent to be bound by coercion through
acts or threats against the state's representative. Id. at art. 51; (2) Acquisition of a state's
consent to be bound through unlawful threat or use of force. Id. at art. 52; (3) Conclusion
of a treaty in conflict with a peremptory norm of international law. Id. at art. 53.
The conditions making treaties voidable at formation are: (1) Consent provided
through an objectively evident violation of a fundamental internal law of the voiding party.
Id. at art. 46; (2) Parties previously notified that the representative giving consent lacked
authority to consent. Id. at art. 47; (3) Innocent mistake of fact at the time of formation
going to the essential basis of the consent of the voiding state. Id. at art 48; (4) Fraud in
the inducement. Id. at art. 49; (5) Consent procured through corruption of the voiding
state's representative. Id. at art. 50.
159 Id at part V, § 3. The post-formation conditions that void bilateral treaties are:
(1) Conclusion of a subsequent agreement that is intended to supersede the prior treaty or
is incompatible with the prior treaty. Id. at art. 59; (2) Emergence of a new peremptory
norm of international law in conflict with the treaty. Id. at art. 64.
The post-formation conditions that make voidable bilateral treaties are: (1) Consent
of the other party to termination. Id. at art. 54(b); (2) An express or implied right to
suspend or terminate a treaty unilaterally. Id. at arts. 54(a), 56; (3) Material breach by the
other party. Id. at art. 60; (4) Supervening impossibility of performance. Id. at art. 61; (5)
Innocent unforeseen fundamental change of circumstance. Id. at art. 62.
160 See infra notes 161-72.
161 Vienna Convention, supra note 64, at art. 62(1).
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an essential basis of the consent to be bound by the treaty, 162 and
radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed
under the treaty.' 63
This justification is at best very weak. Not only was the emer-
gence of directed energy weapons foreseen, but Agreed Statement D
to the ABM Treaty explicitly deals with "ABM systems based on
other physical principles," such as directed energy systems. 164 Fur-
thermore, although progress in directed energy technology has
made ballistic missile defense more tempting, that progress has not
radically transformed the magnitude of the obligation not to deploy
prohibited ballistic missile defenses. The Soviet Union's military
build up165 also fails to establish a legally sufficient fundamental
change of circumstance. As a general principle of international law,
mere changes in the balance of power between parties are insuffi-
cient to justify terminating treaty obligations. 166
The Soviet phased-array radar 167 located near Krasnoyarsk pro-
vides a more promising legal justification for those advocating termi-
nation of the ABM Treaty. Agreed Statement F to the ABM Treaty
prohibits phased-array radars of the size and location of the Krasno-
yarsk radar, unless the phased array is "for the purposes of tracking
objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verifi-
cation."' 68 The difficulty in determining whether the radar estab-
lishes a violation is that the determination turns on the intended
purpose of the radar. This type of problem is hardly new to the law.
Municipal law fact finders often draw conclusions of intent from cir-
cumstantial evidence.' 69
Several circumstances make it more probable than not that the
Krasnoyarsk radar complex is a prohibited early warning or ABM
battle management radar rather than an allowable space tracking or
162 1d at art. 62(i)(a).
163 Il at art. 62(i)(b).
164 Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Agreed Statement D. See also Strategic Arms
Limitation Agreements, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
20 (1972).
165 See infra note 192.
166 A. McNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 376 (1938) (McNair's opinion is subject to criti-
cism because the three criteria under the Vienna Convention for termination due to
changed circumstances may be met by the combination of the Soviet Union's arms build
up and the emergence of new ABM technologies).
167 Phased-array radars are electronically steered radars pointed in various directions
to produce a widespread image.
168 Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Agreed Statement F. See also OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE: WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS 51 (1984) (large
phased-array radars are permissible at the designated ABM cite, the designated ABM test
ranges, and along the national boarders pointed outward, but the Krasnoyarsk radar does
not meet any of these exceptions) [hereinafter cited as ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE].
169 Consider the requirements of an intent to kill for first degree murder, an intent to
permanently deprive a person of property for larceny, and an intent to cause emotional
distress for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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treaty verification radar. First, the positioning of the radar makes it
nearly useless as a verification radar.'70 Second, although the radar
would be useful for space tracking, it does not appear to be optimally
placed for such purposes. 171 Third, the location of the radar com-
plex enables the radar to fill an important gap in the Soviet Union's
early warning system. 172 The four most eminent American support-
ers of the ABM Treaty and critics of ballistic missile defense admit
that the most likely purpose of the Krasnoyarsk radar is to give early
warning of an attack by submarine-launched missiles on Siberian
missile fields.' 75 The United States Government also has deter-
mined that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the ABM
Treaty. 174
In addition to the Krasnoyarsk phased-array radar, inconclusive
evidence indicates the existence of other possible violations by the
Soviet Union. In contravention of the ban on mobile ABM sys-
tems, 175 the SA-X-12 anti-tactical missile may be designed to counter
strategic ballistic missiles and may be mobile. 176 Concealment of
test data may constitute a prohibited deliberate interference with
United States verification of Soviet treaty compliance. 177 Some ele-
ments of the arms control establishment even allege that the piece-
by-piece relocation of an ABM radar from Sary Shagan to Kamchatka
constitutes a breach of the mobile radar proscription.17 8
Under customary international law, a breach of a treaty obliga-
tion does not justify termination of the treaty unless the breach is
material.179 The Vienna Convention limits material breach to unjus-
tified repudiation'is and violations of provisions essential to the ac-
complishment of the object and purpose of a treaty.' 8 ' To justify
termination of the ABM Treaty on the grounds of material breach,
the United States would have to argue that the provisions prohibit-
ing the construction of the phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk are es-
170 ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE, supra note 168, at 51.
171 Id
172 Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, The President's Choice. Star Wars or Arms Control,
63 FOREIGN AFF. 264, 275 (1985).
173 Id (the Krasnoyarsk radar is "a violation of the express language of the Treaty"
but "is of only marginal importance").
174 Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1985, at AI, col. 1.
175 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. V.
176 Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1985, at AI0, col. 1.
177 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. XII (the Soviet Union insists that the data denied
has nothing to do with the tested missile's ABM capability).
178 Washington Times, July 10, 1984, at 1, col. 6. Following this construction of the
term mobile, the White House is a mobile home and the President is violating the District
of Columbia zoning code.
179 Vienna Convention, supra note 64, at art. 60(1); B. SINHA, UNILATERAL DENUNCIA-
TION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY 19 passim
(1966).
180 Vienna Convention, supra note 64, at art. 60(3)(a).
181 d. at art. 60(3)(b).
[VOL. 10
ABM TREATY
sential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the ABM
Treaty. Although it is often difficult to demonstrate whether a provi-
sion is or is not essential to the accomplishment of the purpose of a
treaty, an unusually strong case can be made for the materiality of
the radar restricting provisions of the ABM Treaty.
The ABM Treaty achieves its basic purpose of preventing a na-
tionwide ballistic missile defense through limitations on three crucial
ballistic missile defense components. The treaty restricts the
number and placement of ABM missiles, launchers, and radar. A vi-
olation of any of the provisions creating these basic restrictions con-
stitutes a breach of an essential provision. The Krasnoyarsk radar
violates two of the basic restrictions on radar placement.' 8 2
Furthermore, large phased-array radar have the longest lead
time of any component necessary to accomplish full-scale break out
from the constraints of the ABM Treaty. The restrictions on large
phased-array radars are the most effective provisions for preventing
secret deployment of a nationwide ballistic missile defense. There-
fore, the provisions violated are among the most essential provisions
of the Treaty.
Although the Krasnoyarsk violation is material under the test
enunciated in the Vienna Convention, the Convention's test is logi-
cally suspect. The Convention's test focuses on whether the provision
breached is essential, rather than whether the violation itself is grave.
Apparently, an extreme violation of a nonessential provision may not
be material under the Convention, while a relatively insignificant vio-
lation of an essential provision is material. The consensus of Ameri-
can international lawyers, however, is that only violations having the
effect of depriving the aggrieved party of an essential benefit of the
agreement justify termination.183
The breach represented by the Krasnoyarsk radar is less impor-
tant if the materiality of the breach is measured by the effect of the
violation rather than the importance of the breached provisions.' 8 4
Unfortunately, the less logical Vienna Convention rule, not the more
logical American consensus rule, has the force of customary interna-
tional law. 185 An innocent party to a violated treaty, however, for-
feits the right to terminate in response to a violation if the party fails
to exercise its right within a reasonable time after discovering the
182 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. VI(b) (deployment of early warning radar not on
national boundary oriented out); Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Agreed Statement F
(large phased-array radar not for space tracking or verification).
183 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 163 (1962).
184 Cf Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, supra note 172, at 275.
185 See The Namibia Case, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 47 (advisory opinion); B. SiNHA, supra note
179, at 31.
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violation. 186
A more easily justified alternative to termination for breach
under customary international law is withdrawal under the ABM
Treaty's withdrawal provision. Article 54 of the Vienna Convention
permits termination of a treaty in conformity with the provisions of
the treaty.' 8 7 The ABM Treaty permits withdrawal if a party "de-
cides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."' 8 8 The standard ap-
plied is the withdrawing party's subjective perception of events re-
lated to ballistic missile defense, limited only by good faith.
Unilateral Statement A to both the ABM Treaty and the SALT I
agreement helps explain the requirements of the ABM Treaty's with-
drawal provision. Unilateral Statement A, made by the United States
during the treaty negotiations, states:
The U.S. delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Govern-
ment attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations
on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty
and on [SALT One] . . .The USSR delegation has also indicated
that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the
achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limita-
tions on strategic offensive arms . . . . If an agreement providing
for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not
achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopard-
ized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty.
189
It is now thirteen years after the Unilateral Statement, and the par-
ties are far from reaching a more complete agreement for limiting
offensive arms. 90
The magnitude of the unchecked strategic nuclear buildup by
both superpowers jeopardizes the supreme interests of all nations,
including the United States.' 9 ' The growth of the Soviet Union's
strategic forces, both in comparison to United States forces and in
absolute terms is particularly threatening.' 9 2 In the light of Unilat-
186 See, e.g., B. SINHA, supra note 179, at 81. This is the international law principle of
extinctive prescription, which is similar to the municipal law rule of equitable estoppel.
187 Vienna Convention, supra note 64, at art. 54(a).
188 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. XV(2). For the text of the Treaty's withdrawal
provision, see supra note 121.
189 See Agreed Statements, supra note 70, at Unilateral Statement A (statement made
by Ambassador Smith on May 9, 1972).
190 According to the Reagan Administration, the SALT II accords do not satisfactorily
protect U.S. interests. Because the accords were not ratified and did not enter into force,
it is unlikely that they constitute an "agreement" within the meaning of Unilateral State-
ment A. See Note, The Legality of a High Technology Missile Defense System: The ABM and Outer
Space Treaties, 78 AM.J. Iwr'L L. 418, 421 (1984).
191 Cf Mendlovitz, Nuclear Arms and World Public Order: A Transformational Perspective 4
N.Y.L. ScH.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 419 (1983) (part of a very informative symposium on arms
control).
192 At the time the ABM Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had approximately 2100
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), while the United States had approximately
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eral Statement A and the express purpose of the ABM Treaty to fur-
ther strategic offensive arms limitations,' 93 the Soviet Union's
strategic arms build up, coupled with its probable material breach of
the ABM Treaty, 194 constitute extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the ABM Treaty that jeopardize United States
supreme interests and legally justify withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty.
The conclusion that the United States reasonably may justify, in
legal terms, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is a limited conclusion.
Neither termination under the treaty's withdrawal provision nor ter-
mination for material breach requires that termination redress either
the jeopardized national interests or the material breach. In other
words, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may be legally justifiable yet
harmful to national security and peace.
VII. Conclusion
The ABM treaty prohibits deployment of a ballistic missile de-
fense system similar to that envisioned by President Reagan's strate-
gic defense initiative. Development of all space-based ABM
components and deployment of all directed energy systems capable
of substituting for ABM missiles, launchers, or radar are banned by
the Treaty. If the United States deploys a nationwide ballistic missile
defense system, termination, suspension, or modification of the ABM
Treaty will be required.
The President has the constitutional authority to terminate a de-
fense treaty such as the ABM Treaty, without legislative consent, in
accordance with a withdrawal provision or in response to a treaty
violation. All other unilateral treaty terminations probably are un-
constitutional. The absence of a constitutional requirement of legis-
lative consent, however, should not be mistaken for the absence of a
political requirement of legislative consent.
Under international law, the United States may legally justify
terminating the ABM treaty on two grounds. First, the Soviet Union
has materially breached the Treaty. The construction of the phased-
array radar near Krasnoyarsk violates treaty provisions essential to
the accomplishment of the object of the Treaty. Second, the Soviet
Union's strategic forces build up, coupled with its breach of the ABM
1900. GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, FISCAL YEAR 1975 UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE
STATEMENT (1975). As of January 1, 1985, the number of SNDVs in the Soviet Union's
arsenal had grown to 2367, while the number of SNDVs in the United States' arsenal had
fallen to 1646. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FISCAL
YEAR 1986 UNITED STATES MILITARY POSTURE STATEMENT (1985). The decline in U.S.
forces is due to the obsolescence of B-52 bombers, Poseiden submarines, and Titan
ICBM's.
193 See Preamble to the ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
194 See supra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
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Treaty, constitute extraordinary events related to the subject matter
of the Treaty that jeopardize the supreme interests of the United
States. These events, therefore, legally justify withdrawing from the
Treaty under the Treaty's withdrawal provision upon six months
written notice. 195 Whether terminating the ABM Treaty is a wise
course of action for United States policymakers turns on issues other
than the mere legality of termination or feasibility of ballistic missile
defense.
The key issue in the brewing ABM Treaty termination contro-
versy is whether terminating the ABM Treaty is more beneficial for
the national security of the United States than continuation of the
Treaty. Currently, the consensus is that continuation, at least for the
near future, furthers national security more than termination. 19 6
The extreme disadvantages of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
make it difficult to imagine any situation short of widespread Soviet
violations warranting withdrawal. 197 The American people expect
arms control. Frustration of this expectation will have an effect on
the willingness of the American people to support strong defense
and active participation in world affairs.
The commitment between the United States and her allies is
central to American national security. This commitment will be
weakened by the political repurcussions of withdrawal. Moreover,
deployment of ballistic missile defenses may nullify the small but im-
portant deterrent power of the Chinese, French, and British strategic
forces.
Many of the systems envisioned by the strategic defense initia-
tive may prove unfeasible. If these systems are feasible, the Soviet
Union could, through greater sacrifice and commitment of re-
sources, beat the United States to deployment. Because air defense
and anti-tactical missile systems are better developed in the Soviet
Union, protection from intercontinental ballistic missiles and sub-
launched ballistic missiles may prove more beneficial to the Soviet
Union than to the United States.
Deployment of ballistic missile defenses will cost a great deal of
money. Currently, the offensive weapons needed to overwhelm bal-
listic missile defenses are cheaper than defensive systems. Further-
more, the money earmarked for deployment of defensive systems
195 ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at art. XV.
196 Even the Reagan Administration currently favors continuation of the Treaty, as evi-
denced by the absence of a denunciation.
197 For a discussion of the arguments against ballistic missile defense, see Drell, Farley
& Holloway, Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative, 9
INT'L SECURrTy 51 (1984). See also Glaser, Why Even Good Defense May be Bad, 9 INT'L SECUR-
ry 92 (1984); T. LONGSTRETH &J. PIKE, supra note 16, at 37-39; UNION OF CONCERNED
ScIEImsTs, THE FAII.ACy OF STAR WARS (1984).
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may be better used by taxpayers or better spent on other govern-
ment programs including conventional defense projects.
Strong arguments also support the strategic defense initia-
tive.198 The chance of nuclear war in any particular year is very
small. If that small yearly probability is analyzed over many years,
however, the long-term probability of nuclear war becomes large. If
ballistic missile defense neutralizes the effectiveness of nuclear weap-
ons, as its architects hope, nuclear disarmament may become more
likely. Only disarmament derails the "statistical inevitability" of nu-
clear disaster. Even a "leaky" ballistic missile defense could prove
useful. Such a system could provide an effective shield against an
accidental missile launch or a terrorist missile attack. Arguably, a bal-
listic missile defense also could bolster deterrence by increasing the
uncertainty of destroying targets and by creating in space what
amounts to a fourth leg of the strategic triad. Terminating the ABM
Treaty also would alleviate the fear that the Soviet Union might
secretly violate the ABM Treaty and catch a treaty-constrained
United States unprepared.
Ultimately, Americans must realize that they live in a risky world.
Both deployment of a ballistic missile defense and adherence to the
ABM Treaty involve risk and uncertainty. The American people can
at any time in the future decide to build a ballistic missile defense.
Once Americans decide to scrap the ABM Treaty, however, there is
no going back.
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198 For discussions of the arguments in favor of ballistic missile defense, see DOD
Assessment, supra note 14; J. SCHELL, THE ABOLmION 112-18 (1984) (America's most fa-
mous disarmament proponent arguing for space-based ballistic missile defense); D. GRA-
HAM, supra note 71; Inglis, Minimum Deterrence, Maximum Stability, 41 BuLL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTs 42 (1985).
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